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再探究不确定状态下违背“确定事件”原则的原因
其他题名Re-examining Reasons Leading to Violations of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle Under Uncertainty
汪祚军1; 李纾1; 房野1
2011
发表期刊心理科学
通讯作者邮箱lishu@psych.ac.cn
ISSN1671-6981
文章类型期刊论文
卷号34期号:6页码:1463-1468
产权排序2
摘要确定事件原则是规范决策理论的基本原则之一。本研究通过选取具有不同文化背景的被试、构建和修改一系列问题情境来考察违背确定事件原则的原因。结果表明,在双重理由的分离情境中,确定事件原则被违背了;而在单一理由的分离情境中,确定事件原则得以遵循。实验结果支持"基于理由的假设"而不支持"思维惰性假设"。文章最后讨论了本研究的理论及现实意义。; Leonard J.Savage's sure-thing principle(1954),a key assumption of the consequentialist conception of decision making under uncertainty,states that if some option x is preferred to y given some other Event A occurs,and if option x is preferred to y given this event A does not occur,then x should be preferred to y even when the outcome of A is unknown.Much theoretical and experimental research has examined whether the sure-thing principle was violated in a variety of situations.But,not as much focus has been placed on examining the reasons why it was violated. Two experiments were conducted to test the so-called "reason-based" account and "reluctance-to-think" account for the violation of the sure-thing principle in the present study.In Experiment 1,60 participants in Singapore were recruited,who were presented a scenario similar to Tversky and Shafir's(1992) vacation situation.The results showed that the mean reported choices for not knowing whether you passed or failed the exam(M=4.13) was well between the mean reported choices of knowing that you passed the exam (M=5.18) and that of knowing that you failed the exam(M=3.13).A test of within-participant contrast(Helmert contrast) showed that there was no significant difference between the effect for not knowing whether you passed or failed the exam and the mean effect of knowing that you passed the exam and knowing that you failed the exam(F(1,59)=.02,n.s.).Thus,no violation of STP was found.In Experiment 2,a 3(decision condition:knowing that Event A occurred vs.knowing that Event A did not occur vs.not knowing whether A occurred,nested within participants)×2(scenario:product promotion vs.job performance)×2(reason posed: one reason vs.two reasons) between-participant repeated factorial design was used to further test the "reasons-based" account and "reluctance -to-think" account.The results showed that there was a significant effect of decision condition(F(2,158)=7.40, p.01) in the designed two-reason scenario.A test of within-participants contrast(Helmert contrast) showed that there was a significant difference between the effect for not knowing whether Event A occurred and the mean effect of knowing that Event A occurred and knowing that Event A did not occur(F(1,79)=9.82,p.01).Thus,a violation of STP was found.In the modified scenario with one-reason posed,participants' the mean reported choices for not knowing whether event A occurred was well between the mean effect of knowing that event A occurred and knowing that event A did not occur.The main effect of the decision condition was not significant, F(1,79)=.13,p.1.Thus,no violation of STP was found. These results showed that participants in the two-reason conditions violated the sure-thing principle but satisfied the sure thing principle in the one-reason conditions as predicted by the "reasons-based" account.It indicated that the sure-thing principle was generally satisfied when decisions were based on a unique reason where it was known that Event A occurred as well as that A did not occur,but was sometimes violated when decisions were based on two incompatible reasons.These results supported the "reasons-based" account rather than the "reluctance-to-think" account. The empirical distinction between the "reasons-based" account and "reluctance-to-think" account,therefore,would deepen our understanding of the reasons for the violation of the sure thing principle.Theoretical and normative implications were discussed.
关键词确定事件原则 分离效应 基于理由的假设 思维惰性假设
学科领域认知心理学
URL查看原文
收录类别CSCD
语种中文
项目资助者1 pe tgj hko addbdgpwv nae yfaj(2011CB711000) ; 国家自然科学基金面上项目(70871110) ; 中国科学院知识创新工程重要方向项目(KSCX2-YW-R-130 ; KSCX2-EW-J-8) ; 北京市重点学科建设项目 ; 宁波大学预研基金项目(xyy10009) ; 宁波大学学科项目(szxw1018)的资助
CSCD记录号CSCD:4397874
引用统计
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符http://ir.psych.ac.cn/handle/311026/15105
专题社会与工程心理学研究室
通讯作者李纾
作者单位1.宁波大学教师教育学院
2.中国科学院心理研究所
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
汪祚军,李纾,房野. 再探究不确定状态下违背“确定事件”原则的原因[J]. 心理科学,2011,34(6):1463-1468.
APA 汪祚军,李纾,&房野.(2011).再探究不确定状态下违背“确定事件”原则的原因.心理科学,34(6),1463-1468.
MLA 汪祚军,et al."再探究不确定状态下违背“确定事件”原则的原因".心理科学 34.6(2011):1463-1468.
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